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COUNTY OF WA4SHINGTON V GUNTHER: THE
SUPREME COURT PROVIDES A TITLE
VII REMEDY FOR VICTIMS OF
INTENTIONAL SEX-BASED
WAGE DISCRIMINATION
During the early 1960's, dramatic steps were taken to ensure equal em-
ployment opportunities for women. The 88th Congress served as the cata-
lyst behind these advances through its enactment of two statutes which
today form the major federal law prohibiting sex-based employment dis-
crimination. In 1963, the 88th Congress passed the Equal Pay Act, which
prohibits wage discrimination on the basis of sex.' One year later, Con-
gress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 which prohibits an
employer from discriminating against individuals in any aspect of the em-
ployment process where such discrimination is based on the employee's
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 3
1. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1976)) [hereinafter cited as the EPA). The Act is an amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
The relevant text of the EPA is as follows:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, be-
tween employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such estab-
lishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor
other than sex ....
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(1976).
2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). The relevant proscriptions of Title VII read as
follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
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A prima facie violation of the EPA occurs when an employee is paid less
than an employee of the opposite sex for equal work in the same establish-
ment.4 Courts have held that in order to satisfy this equal work standard,
the plaintiff must show that he or she was performing a job "substantially
equal" to that being performed by an employee of the opposite sex. 5 How-
ever, the employer may rebut this prima facie case by asserting one of the
EPA's four affirmative defenses.6 These defenses allow a pay differential if
it is either made pursuant to a seniority, merit, or piecework system, or
based on any factor other than sex.7
Under Title VII, a prima facie sex discrimination case may be estab-
lished upon one of two general theories: "disparate treatment" or "dispa-
rate impact."'8 A prima facie disparate treatment case is established by
showing that an employer has treated some individuals less favorably than
others because of their sex.9 Under the disparate impact theory, a prima
facie case is established by showing that a facially neutral employment
practice is sexually discriminatory in application.' °
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
4. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
5. The first case to adopt the "substantially equal" standard was Shultz v. Wheaton
Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). All other circuits
which have considered the standard have now adopted it. See, e.g., Usery v. Columbia
Univ., 568 F.2d 953, 958 (2d Cir. 1977); Ridgway v. United Hospitals-Miller Div., 563 F.2d
923, 926 (8th Cir. 1977); Brennan v. South Davis Community Hosp., 538 F.2d 859, 861 (10th
Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Golden Isles Convalescent Homes, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256, 1257 (5th Cir.
1972) (per curiam), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 905 (1973).
The substantially equal standard was adopted so that employers would not be able to
frustrate the purpose of the EPA by pointing to minute differences between male and female
jobs. On the other hand, the standard does not allow plaintiffs to compare otherwise
unequal jobs as the basis of an EPA suit. See Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235,
238 (5th Cir. 1973) (standard is lower than absolute identity but higher than mere
comparability).
6. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974).
7. 'See note I supra.
8. See, e.g., Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the
CivilRights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 458 (1979). These theories apply to all
forms of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Id at 459.
9. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (prima facie
case of racial discrimination established). Once this prima facie case has been established,
the burden shifts to the employer to set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
disparate treatment. Id Upon such a showing, the plaintiff may produce evidence to rebut
the employer's justification as a mere pretext for discriminating. Id at 804. See also Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (racial discrimination).
10. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (racial discrimination).
The classic example of such an employment practice is a test used by an employer as a basis
for hiring or promotion. A prima facie violation of Title VII occurs where such a test dis-
qualifies members of a class protected under Title VII at a higher rate than members of
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The EPA is narrower than Title VII because it only proscribes wage
discrimination, whereas Title VII applies to all facets of the employment
process, including hiring and promotion. The coverage of these statutes
overlaps in the area of sex-based wage discrimination, however, since indi-
viduals whose wages have been discriminatorily depressed because of their
sex may sue under either the EPA or Title VII. l Presumably, plaintiffs
could sue under Title VII and circumvent both the EPA's equal work re-
quirement and its four affirmative defenses. In an effort to harmonize the
two statutes, Senator Bennett proposed, and Congress adopted, a clarifying
amendment to Title VII prior to its passage. 2 The Bennett Amendment
provides that, under Title VII, an employer may lawfully differentiate
upon the basis of sex in setting employee wages if such differentiation is
"authorized" by the EPA.' 3
Ironically, this amendment, which was intended to clarify the scope of
Title VII's sex-based wage discrimination coverage, has posed grave
problems of interpretation for the courts.' 4 Specifically, the question has
been whether a sex-based wage discrimination suit may be brought under
Title VII even though it does not satisfy the EPA's standard of sub-
stantially equal work. In County of Washington v. Gunther,'5 the Supreme
Court answered this question affirmatively. However, the Court explicitly
left open the issue whether such a suit may be maintained under circum-
stances other than where intentional sex discrimination is proven by direct
evidence.'
6
society in general. The employer must then show that the test is job-related and "[t]he
touchstone is business necessity." Id at 431. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977) (employer's height and weight requirements for job applicants held unlawful since
they disqualified women at a higher rate than men and were not shown to be necessary for
effective job performance).
11. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 101 S. Ct. 2242 (1981) (wage discrimi-
nation suit under Title VII); Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (wage
discrimination suit under the EPA).
12. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(h), 78 Stat. 257 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1976)).
13. Id The Bennett Amendment provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of title 29 [ie., the
EPA].
Id
14. See Part II Mfra.
15. 101 S. Ct. 2242 (1981).
16. Id at 2254. The Court thus left open the complex and volatile issue of "comparable
worth," which would entitle female plaintiffs to Title VII relief where they could show that
male employees performing comparable, although not necessarily equal, jobs were paid a
1981]
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Alberta Gunther and three of her female colleagues were jail matrons at
the Washington County (Oregon) jail. They brought a Title VII action
against the county, 7 alleging that they were denied equal pay for work
substantially equal to that performed by male guards, or in the alternative,
that, even if the work was not substantially equal, some of the discrepancy
in their wages was the result of intentional sex discrimination."8 The dis-
trict court found that the male and female jobs were not substantially
equal,'9 and then held as a matter of law that a sex-based wage discrimina-
tion claim could not be brought under Title VII unless it satisfied the equal
work standard of the EPA.
2 0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in
part, holding that the district court's factual finding that the jobs lacked
higher salary. The leading article advocating comparable worth is Wage Discrimination,
supra note 8. Professor Blumrosen's article points out that many jobs are now segregated on
the basis of sex, and of these jobs, the lower-paying ones tend to be held by women. Blum-
rosen's thesis is that the lower wages are not entirely the result of legitimate factors; instead,
some of the low wages can be explained only by the fact that they have been discriminatorily
depressed because the jobs are occupied by women. Professor Blumrosen then argues that a
showing of job segregation should justify an inference of discriminatorily depressed wages,
and thus prima facie entitle the plaintiff to a remedy. Strictly speaking, Blumrosen's model
would not require a court to compare the value of unequal jobs, but she does suggest such a
comparison as one possible way to measure the damages. Furthermore, the employer would
often want to compare the value of unequal jobs in an attempt to rebut Blumrosen's infer-
ence that the female jobs are discriminatorily underpaid. Not all commentators have ac-
cepted Blumrosen's model as consistent with Title VII theories of liability. See, e.g., Nelson,
Opton and Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective,
13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 231 (1980) (arguing against Blumrosen's thesis). But see Blumrosen,
Wage Discrimination and Job Segregation.- The Survival of a Theory, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
1 (1980) (responding to the Nelson, Opton and Wilson article).
17. Gunther v. County of Washington, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 788, 789 (1976), a7din
part, rev'd in part, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), aft'd,
101 S. Ct. 2242 (1981). Plaintiffs could not sue under the EPA since the Act did not apply to
municipal employees until the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No, 93-259, § l(a), 88 Stat. 55, 59-63 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970)). The
amendments took effect on May 1, 1974, and plaintiffs' jobs were terminated on Jan. 15,
1974. Thus plaintiffs could sue only under Title VII, which has applied to municipal em-
ployees since passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
261, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970)).
18. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 791. Plaintiffs also alleged that the county violated
§ 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976), by abolishing their jobs in retaliation for
their equal pay suit. The district court rejected this claim, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
This issue was not before the Supreme Court. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 101 S.
Ct. at 2245 n.4.
19. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 791. The basis for the court's finding that the jobs
lacked substantial equality was that the male guards were responsible for more than 10 times
as many prisoners as were the female matrons. Thus, much of the matrons' time was spent




substantial equality was "not clearly erroneous," and therefore should not
be overturned. 21 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
holding that a sex-based wage discrimination claim was barred under Title
VII unless, as required by the EPA, a showing of substantial equality was
made.22 The court remanded the case, instructing the district court to hear
the plaintiffs' evidence that part of the wage discrepancy was attribut-
able to sex discrimination.23 The Ninth Circuit subsequently denied the
county's petition for rehearing.24
In its supplemental opinion denying rehearing, the court made it clear
that it had not adopted a comparable worth theory. It emphasized that a
showing that the jobs performed by the plaintiffs were of comparable value
to those performed by male guards would not be sufficient to entitle the
plaintiffs to relief under Title VII.25 The court, however, failed to specify
what further showing was required. The county obtained a writ of certio-
rari,26 and the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision, hold-
ing that a showing of substantial equality was not a prerequisite to a Title
VII suit in which the plaintiffs sought to prove by direct evidence that their
wages had been discriminatorily depressed on account of their sex. 27 Ac-
cording to the Court, the Bennett Amendment did not incorporate the
EPA's equal work requirement into Title VII sex-based wage discrimina-
tion cases. However, the Court took great care to note that it was not de-
ciding the propriety of a Title VII claim based on comparable worth.28
The four dissenters criticized the majority's interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment, arguing that the legislative history demonstrated that Con-
gress had meant to incorporate the EPA's equal work requirement into
Title VII suits alleging sex-based wage discrimination.29
This Note will discuss the legislative history surrounding the congres-
sional response to sex-based wage discrimination, and the lower courts'
interpretations of the Bennett Amendment. It will focus upon the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Gunther, and demonstrate that the case
21. Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1979), af9'd, 101 S.
Ct. 2242 (1981). This standard for appellate court review is consistent with FED. R. Civ. P.
52(a) which states in pertinent part that "[flindings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous. .. "
22. 602 F.2d at 891.
23. Id.
24. Gunther v. County of Washington, 623 F.2d 1303, 1317 (9th Cir. 1980).
25. 623 F.2d at 1321.
26. 449 U.S. 950 (1980).
27. County of Washington v. Gunther, 101 S. Ct. 2242, 2246-47 (1981).
28. Id at 2246, 2253-54.
29. Id. at 2254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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was correctly decided, albeit inadequately reasoned. Finally, the Note will
examine the impact of Gunther on the future of Title VII sex discrimina-
tion litigation.
I. CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF SEX-BASED WAGE
DISCRIMINATION: A LOOK AT THE CONFUSING LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
.4. The EPA's Requirement of Equal Work
From 1945 through 1963, bills regarding sex-based wage discrimination
had been introduced into every Congress.3° In 1962, the House Commit-
tee on Education and Labor reported a bill which would have required
equal pay for comparable work.3 When the bill reached the House floor,
Representative St. George introduced an amendment to replace the com-
parable work language in the bill with a provision requiring equal pay for
equal work.32
With backing from the Kennedy Administration, the sponsors of the
original comparable work bill urged the House to reject the St. George
Amendment. 33 Their efforts proved unsuccessful, and the House passed a
bill requiring equal pay for equal, not comparable, work.34 Although the
Senate also passed an equal pay for equal work bill in 1962, there were
minor differences between the two versions and the 87th Congress ad-
journed before those differences could be worked out.35
In the following year, equal pay legislation that specifically retained the
equal work requirement of the St. George Amendment was reintroduced
30. See Gitt and Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential Protec-
tions Under Title VII, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 723, 737 (1977).
31. H.R. 11677, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 CONG. REc. 14748, 14751 (1962).
32. 108 CONG. REC. 14767 (1962). Rep. St. George explained her purpose as follows:
What we want to do in this bill is to make it exactly what it says. It is called
equal pay for equal work in some of the committee hearings. There is a great
difference between the word "comparable" and the word "equal." . . . The word
"comparable" opens up great vistas. It gives tremendous latitude to whoever is to
be arbitrator in these disputes.
Id
33. Id at 14768-69. The support of the Kennedy Administration was made clear by a
letter from Labor Secretary Goldberg, stating that "'[comparable' is a key word in our
proposal." Id at 14768.
34. The House passed H.R. 11677 on July 25, 1962. Id at 14782.
35. See, e.g., 109 CONG. REc. 9195 (1963) (statement of Rep. Powell recounting that
equal pay bills had been passed by both the House and Senate in 1962, but that equal pay
legislation was not enacted due to failure to reconcile the differences between the two ver-
sions); id at 9204 (statement of Rep. Pepper to the same effect).
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into the House.36 Representative Goodell noted that the change from
comparability to equality was a deliberate effort to narrow the scope of the
bill.3' Goodell emphasized that his bill was not intended to allow the com-
parison of unequal jobs.38
Other House members, commenting on similar bills, were equally vehe-
ment in rejecting a comparable work standard. Representative Freling-
huysen stressed that the equal pay bill was "not intended to compare
unrelated jobs, or jobs that have been historically and normally considered
by the industry to be different."'39 Representative Griffin agreed, and gave
the example that the jobs of inspector and assembler could not be com-
pared under the proposed legislation.'
On May 23, 1963, the House passed an equal pay bill.4 ' After concur-
rence by the Senate,42 it became the Equal Pay Act, a supplemental
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 43 As the legislative
history demonstrates, Congress intended a narrow construction of the EPA
to require employers to pay their employees equally only for work sub-
stantially. equal in nature. Furthermore, Congress tempered the EPA by
establishing four affirmative defenses to any action brought under it.'
B. Title VII" Remedying Sex Discrimination as an Afterthought
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was initially designed to put an
end to discrimination in employment based on "race, color, religion, or
national origin."45 It did not include a prohibition against discrimination
36. See Hearings on H.RA 3861 and Related Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor
of he House Comm on Educ. and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1963).
37. 109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963).
38. Id
39. Id. at 9196.
40. Id at 9197.
41. See 109 CONG. REC. 9217-18 (1963). The bill finally passed by the House was an
amended version of H.R. 6060. Id at 9218. H.R. 6060 had been the equal pay bill reported
out by the House Committee on Education and Labor. See [1963] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 687.
42. The Senate adopted the language of the House bill, and it was this bill that became
the EPA. See [19631 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687.
43. See note I supra. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was enacted to guarantee
certain adequate working conditions for covered employees. Its protections include the es-
tablishment of a minimum wage (29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1976)) and maximum working hours
(29 U.S.C. § 207 (1976)). Rather than enacting separate legislation, the 88th Congress de-
cided to pass the EPA as a supplemental amendment to the FLSA. This allowed Congress
to apply the provisions of the FLSA regarding enforcement and employer coverage to the
EPA. See [1963] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 687, 688.
44. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
45. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1964).
19811
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based upon sex until late in the House floor debate when Representative
Smith proposed amending Title VII to include a proscription of sex dis-
crimination in the employment process.46 The House passed the amend-
ment that same day,47 and passed the entire bill two days later.48 In an
effort to expedite the enactment of the civil rights legislation, the Senate
dealt with the House version without first referring it to committee.
49
The House thus added the proscription against sex discrimination in Ti-
tle VII at the last minute, and both the House and Senate considered it
without the benefit of prior committee hearings and reports. Conse-
quently, Congress had focused little attention upon the interrelationship of
the EPA and Title VII with regard to sex-based wage discrimination. Sen-
ator Clark quickly recognizing this weakness, attempted to rectify any pos-
sible inconsistencies between the two statutes by inserting a memorandum
into the Congressional Record. In pertinent part, this memorandum stated:
"The standards in the Equal Pay Act for determining discrimination as to
wages, of course, are applicable to the comparable situation under [T]itle
VII.,,5o
Senator Clark's memorandum does little to clarify the problem of
whether Title VII sex-based wage discrimination suits require a showing of
equal work. Its meaning depends on how broadly one defines a "compara-
ble situation" under Title VII. These words can be defined to mean that
the only sex-based wage discrimination claims which can be brought
under Title VII are those involving equal pay for equal work. However,
an equally plausible interpretation is that Senator Clark intended only that
the EPA standards would control where an equal work claim was made,
and did not intend that intentional sex-based wage discrimination claims
be limited to situations where the plaintiff could prove that a member of
the opposite sex held an equal job. In any event, Senator Clark's memo-
randum is of uncertain value since it was written over two months before
the introduction of the Bennett Amendment, which was the official attempt
46. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964). Smith's motives for adding sex discrimination to Title
VII have been questioned. Some commentators suggest that Smith, an outspoken critic of
Title VII, added the sex amendment in an attempt to block passage of the entire bill. See,
e.g., Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law I. Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HAST. L.J. 305, 310-13 (1968); Miller, Sex
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 880-83
(1967).
47. 110 CONG. REc. 2584 (1964).
48. Id at 2804-05.
49. 20 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 354 (1964).
50. 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964).
[Vol. 31:123
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by Congress to clarify the relationship between Title VII and the EPA.51
C. The Bennett Amendment: More Ambiguity
The Bennett Amendment was introduced in 1964 during the Senate de-
bate on Title VII. It provides that pay differentials based on sex, if author-
ized by the EPA, are not unlawful.52  Senator Bennett introduced his
amendment onto the floor with the stated purpose of ensuring that the
provisions of the EPA were not "nullified" by passage of Title VII.5" He
further stated that the amendment was designed to avoid "possible" con-
flicts with the EPA.54 However, for a number of reasons these introduc-
tory remarks have not provided a particularly instructive source of
legislative intent. First, Senator Bennett did not elaborate on any specific
conflicts which he may have envisioned, nor did he indicate how he felt
that Title VII might nullify the provisions of the EPA. Bennett's reference
to his amendment as merely a "technical correction" of Title VII adds fur-
ther confusion.55
After Senator Bennett had spoken, Senator Dirksen added his own cryp-
51. The uncertain value of the Clark memorandum is illustrated by the split in the
Supreme Court in Gunther over the proper weight to be accorded it. The majority of the
Court totally discounted the memorandum since it relates to Title VII prior to the introduc-
tion of the Bennett Amendment. 101 S. Ct. at 2249 n. 12. In contrast, the dissent felt that it
had a bearing on congressional intent. Id at 2259 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
53. 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964).
54. Id Senator Bennett's comments were as follows:
Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members of the fair sex in this
country, and after very careful study by the appropriate committees of Congress,
last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, which became effective only
yesterday.
By this time, programs have been established for the effective administration of
this act. Now, when the civil rights bill is under consideration, in which the word
"sex" has been inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention may
have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the word
"sex" in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act.
The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the
provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified.
I understand that the leadership in charge of the bill have agreed to the amend-
ment as a proper technical correction of the bill. If they will confirm that under-
stand [sic], I shall ask that the amendment be voted on without asking for the yeas
and nays.
Id
55. Id It is not clear whether "technical" should be interpreted to mean insignificant.
See the contrasting interpretations of the majority and dissent in County of Washington v.
Gunther, 101 S. Ct. at 2250 (majority); id at 2259 n.5 (dissent).
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tic thoughts on the amendment noting that the Fair Labor Standards Act56
contained certain "exceptions" and that all the Bennett Amendment did
was recognize those exceptions. 7 The meaning of this statement is far
.from clear since the word "exceptions" is ambiguous. One possible inter-
pretation is that "exceptions" refers to the exemptions from the coverage of
the Fair Labor Standards Act granted to certain businesses.5 Under this
interpretation, the Bennett Amendment would ensure that EPA standards
(including the equal work requirement) apply to sex-based wage discrimi-
nation cases brought under Title VII, even though the EPA itself might be
inapplicable. Another possibility is that "exceptions" refers to the four af-
firmative defenses59 contained in the EPA, and that Senator Dirksen was
concerned with preserving these defenses in actions brought under Title
VII.
The final significant piece of pre-passage legislative history is a state-
ment by Representative Celler, explaining the Bennett Amendment to his
colleagues in the House of Representatives prior to their vote on the bill.
Celler stated that the amendment "provides that compliance with the Fair
Labor Standards Act as amended [the EPA] satisfies the requirement of
the title barring discrimination because of sex [Title VII]."60 A literal in-
terpretation of this comment would render Title VII a nullity with regard
to sex discrimination. Such an interpretation could result in the anoma-
lous situation of allowing an employer who blatantly violates Title VII by
refusing to hire women to avoid liability by showing "compliance" with
the EPA provisions, which do not extend to discrimination in hiring.
Thus, Celler's comments supplement the already confusing legislative his-
tory surrounding the Bennett Amendment.
Soon after the enactment of Title VII, a commentator pointed out that
the Bennett Amendment had not satisfactorily clarified the relationship
between Title VII and the EPA, since the amendment was itself ambigu-
56. As previously noted, the EPA is an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act.
See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
57. 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964). Senator Dirksen's full statement was:
We were aware of the conflict that might develop, because the Equal Pay Act
was an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair Labor Standards
Act carries out certain exceptions.
All that the pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions, that are car-
ried in the basic act.
Therefore, this amendment is necessary, in the interest of clarification.
Id
58. For example, the EPA does not apply to employers engaged in retail sales, fishing,
agriculture, and various other occupations. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1976).
59. See note 1 supra.
60. 110 CONG. REc. 15896 (1964).
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ous. 6' In a final effort to convey the import of his amendment, Senator
Bennett inserted an explanatory statement into the Congressional Record.
Bennett argued that his amendment allowed employers who were exempt
from the EPA to avoid sex-based wage discrimination suits under Title VII
as well.62 Senator Dirksen agreed with Senator Bennett that this was the
interpretation he and Senator Humphrey had in mind when the Senate
added the amendment.63 Senator Clark, however, criticized Senator Ben-
nett for introducing ex postfacto legislative history.6  Nevertheless, he
placed into the Congressional Record a letter from the Chairman of the
National Committee for Equal Pay which stated that an employee outside
the EPA's coverage was not barred from suing under Title VII by virtue of
the Bennett Amendment. Senator Clark commended the reasoning in this
letter.65
In 1977 a Senate committee reporting on amendments to Title VII cre-
ated additional post-passage legislative history. The committee explained
that the Bennett Amendment authorizes only those pay differentials which
can be supported by one of the EPA's four affirmative defenses.66 How-
ever, the report suffers from the same defect as the post-passage comments
of Senators Bennett, Dirksen, and Clark. Retrospective legislative history
is always suspect, 67 and in light of the contradictory nature of these state-
ments, they should be viewed accordingly.
The final materials bearing on the meaning of the Bennett Amendment
are the guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), the federal agency entrusted with the enforcement of Title
VII.6 ' The EEOC's initial guideline interpreted the Bennett Amendment
61. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 62, 75-76 (1964).
62. 111 CONG. REC. 13359 (1965).
63. Id
64. Id at 18263. In pertinent part, Senator Clark commented as follows:
Mr. President, as all senators know, legislative history cannot be written after the
fact. . . . [Tihe intent of Congress in enacting particular legislation must be dis-
covered from the words of the enactment themselves, and through explanatory col-
loquy prior to the enactment if such is available, but never through explanations
made on the Senate floor long after enactment.
Id Senator Clark's strong views regarding the impropriety of post-passage legislative his-
tory, however, did not prevent him from adding his own interpretation. See text accompa-
nying note 65 infra.
65. 111 CONG. REC. at 18263.
66. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977).
67. See, e.g., R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
179-83 (1975).
68. Congress created the EEOC when it passed Title VII and granted it power to en-
force that statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5 (1976).
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as applying the EPA's equal work standard to sex-based wage discrimina-
tion cases brought under Title VII. 6 9 Furthermore, the original guideline
was followed in several opinion letters written by the EEOC's acting gen-
eral counsel.70 However, in 1972, the EEOC promulgated a new guideline,
still in effect today, which eliminated the language of the original guideline
that the equal work standard applied to Title VII cases.7 Although the
current guideline does not discuss whether the Bennett Amendment incor-
porates the equal work standard into Title VII, the EEOC filed an amicus
curiae brief in Gunther maintaining that the equal work standard was not
so incorporated.72
Once again, it is unclear what significance should be given to these
guidelines in light of their confficting nature. Although the Supreme
Court has noted that EEOC interpretations of Title VII are entitled to
"great deference, 73 the Court has also stated that EEOC guidelines which
contradict an earlier position taken by the agency are entitled to little
weight.
74
II. THE LOWER COURTS' RESPONSES TO THE BENNETT AMENDMENT
In response to this confusing legislative history, the federal courts have
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1966).
70. See, e.g., Acting General Counsel's Memorandum of June 6, 1967, App. to Brief for
Petitioners at 21a-22a, County of Washington v. Gunther, 101 S. Ct. 2242 (1981), which
states:
Differentiations which are authorized under [the Bennett Amendment] are dif-
ferentiations on the basis of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions, and
differentiations related to a seniority system, a merit system, a system which meas-
ures earnings by quantity or quality of production or a differential based on any
other factor than sex.
It is the interpretation of these provisions that requires harmonization between
Title VII and the Equal Pay [Act], because these are the provisions which, within
the meaning of [the Bennett Amendment], "authorize" differentiations.
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1980). The present guideline reads as follows:
Relationship of title VII to the Equal Pay Act.
(a) The employee coverage of the prohibitions against discrimination based on
sex contained in title VII is coextensive with that of the other prohibitions con-
tained in title VII and is not limited by section 703(h) to those employees covered
by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
(b) By virtue of section 703(h), a defense based on the Equal Pay Act may be
raised in a proceeding under title VII.
(c) Where such a defense is raised the Commission will give appropriate consid-
eration to the interpretations of the Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, De-
partment of Labor, but will not be bound thereby.
72. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 101 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (1981).
73. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
74. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976).
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developed two distinct views as to the effect of the Bennett Amendment on
the ability of a plaintiff to bring a sex-based wage discrimination claim
under Title VII." These views will be referred to as the substantive over-
lap theory76 and the four defenses theory.
Courts adopting the substantive overlap theory have held that the sub-
stantive provisions of the EPA (equal pay for equal work and the four
affirmative defenses) are incorporated into Title VII sex-based wage dis-
crimination cases but that EPA procedural requirements, such as its em-
ployer coverage, are not. It is unclear how many of the circuits actually
subscribed to this theory prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gunther.
The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits had all
stated that a Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claim could not be
maintained absent a showing of equal work.7 However, in none of these
cases was the court faced with the question whether a plaintiff who had
proven intentional sex discrimination could maintain a wage discrimina-
tion suit without showing that she performed work substantially equal to
that of male employees who were paid more.78
75. Initially, a third construction was possible. Courts could have given a broad con-
struction to the Bennett Amendment and held that an employer who did not run afoul of the
EPA could not be sued under Title VII for sex-based wage discrimination. The result of this
would have been that an employer who was covered by Title VII, but exempt from the EPA,
would be free to discriminate against women in the setting of wages even though that same
employer would be required to hire and promote women in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Due perhaps to this anomalous result, no court has ever adopted this theory although Sena-
tor Bennett later suggested that this was what he had in mind when he introduced his
amendment. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
76. See Note, Wage Discrimination Under Title VIIAfter IUE v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 67 VA. L. REV. 589, 603 (1981). The author of this Note first adopted the term,
"substantive overlap theory," to refer to this concept.
77. See, e.g., Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 230 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980); Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 596 (8th
Cir. 1978); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 865 (1975).
78. Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 244 (1980) (plaintiffs proceeded solely on a comparable worth theory; they did not
allege intentional sex discrimination); Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 597
(8th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff showed equal work, so any discussion of the consequences of failing
to show equal work is dicta); Onf v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 171 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975) (plaintiff alleged, but failed to prove, intentional
discrimination).
The possibility that these courts may have used broader language than they would have
had they been faced with proven intentional sex discrimination is demonstrated by two
Tenth Circuit cases. In Lemons, the Tenth Circuit held that the EPA's equal work require-
ment was incorporated into Title VII, and thus dismissed a comparable worth claim. 620
F.2d at 229-30. However, in the previous case of Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624
F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980), the court had allowed a claim of intentional sex-based wage dis-
crimination even though the plaintiff did not satisfy the equal work requirement. 624 F.2d
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The case which came closest to barring victims of intentional sex dis-
crimination from a remedy because they had failed to show equal work
was Stastny v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. 79 In Stasny, the
plaintiffs alleged that they had been discriminatorily underpaid because of
their sex, and the district court granted relief under Title VII.8° However,
on appeal, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the claim, stating that the failure
of the female employees to show that they performed work substantially
equal to that performed by male employees "constitute[d] a total failure of
proof."'" While this broad language would seem to indicate that it fol-
lowed the substantive overlap theory, the court was extremely vague about
whether it interpreted the complaint as alleging intentional sex discrimina-
tion or merely a denial of equal pay for comparable work. The Fourth
Circuit's position was further clouded by the fact that in a previous case, it
had implied in dictum that an intentional sex-based wage discrimination
claim could be brought under Title VII without a showing of equal work. 2
The other construction of the Bennett Amendment which federal courts
have adopted is the four defenses theory. Under this theory, the Bennett
Amendment merely incorporates the EPA's four affirmative defenses (and
not the equal work requirement) into Title VII suits involving sex discrimi-
nation in the setting of wages. Until the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Gun-
ther, no circuit had accepted this theory in anything other than dictum. 3
After the Ninth Circuit announced Gunther, two other courts of appeals
based decisions on this theory. In both Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade,
at 953. Fitzgerald is discussed further in the text accompanying notes 86-89 infra. Interest-
ingly, not even once was Fitzgerald referred to in Lemons.
79. 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980).
80. Id at 271.
81. Id at 281.
82. See EEOC v. Aetna Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 719, 724 n.5 (4th Cir. 1980). Aetna was
brought under the EPA and, therefore, did not involve Title VII or the Bennett Amendment.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit gratuitously added the following footnote:
Both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2, protect workers against sexual discrimination in employment. The EPA, how-
ever, is more limited in scope, applying only to claims of unequal pay for equal
work based upon sex. Title VII is broader and affords a worker the opportunity to
challenge other discriminatory compensation practices. Section 2000e-2(h) spe-
cially provides that the four exemptions in the EPA apply to actions brought pur-
suant to Title VII which claim sexual discrimination in wages or compensation
paid or to be paid.
Id (citing the Ninth Circuit's original opinion in Gunther).
83. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (a sex-predicated wage differential is immune from attack




Inc. 4 and UE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,8" the courts allowed claims
of intentional sex-based wage discrimination even though the female
plaintiffs did not perform jobs equal to those performed by men.
In Fitzgerald, the plaintiff brought suit under Title VII, alleging that her
employer had consistently refused to pay her the same salary it would have
paid to a male for equal work.86 However, since she occupied a unique
job, she could not allege that men were being paid more for substantially
equal work.87 The district court nevertheless granted the plaintiff relief
and the employer appealed, asserting that the Bennett Amendment incor-
porated the equal work requirement into Title VII.88 In rejecting this ar-
gument and affirming the district court, the Tenth Circuit held that only
the EPA's four affirmative defenses were incorporated into Title VII.8 9
The facts of Westinghouse were more complicated, but the rationale un-
derlying the court's decision was the same. During the 1930's, Westing-
house had segregated the jobs in one of its plants by sex and intentionally
depressed the wages for job categories occupied by women.9° At the time
of the suit, jobs were no longer explicitly segregated by sex, but de facto
segregation existed and the salaries for those jobs occupied primarily by
females remained depressed.9 The plaintiffs, workers in jobs predomi-
nantly occupied by women, sought Title VII relief from Westinghouse's
present salary structure, which they alleged embodied the prior intentional
discrimination.92 The district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment since the plaintiffs did not make a showing of equal
work.9" The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the Bennett Amendment
incorporated only the EPA's four affirmative defenses, and not the equal
work requirement, into Title VII.94 Thus, the court aligned itself with
those circuits following the four defenses theory.
84. 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
85. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3122 (1981).
86. 624 F.2d at 950.
87. Id at 953. The plaintiff worked in the advertising department, id at 949-50, per-
forming a job that was unique because it was dissimilar from those of her predecessor or any
of her current co-workers.
88. Id
89. Id
90. 631 F.2d at 1097.
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id at 1096.
94. Id at 1099.
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IIl. COUNTY OF WASHINGTON V GUNTHER: THE SUPREME COURT
PROVIDES A PARTIAL ANSWER
A. The Four Defenses Theory Prevails
The issue before the Supreme Court in Gunther was whether the Bennett
Amendment precluded a Title VII claim of intentional sex-based wage dis-
crimination. The plaintiff-respondents argued that they should be allowed
to present direct evidence showing that the county had intentionally de-
pressed their wages because of their sex.95 Conversely, the county peti-
tioned the Supreme Court to dismiss respondents' claims, contending that
the Bennett Amendment was designed to prevent plaintiffs from avoiding
the EPA's equal work requirement by filing suit under Title VII. 06
The majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the respondents and
adopted the four defenses theory. The Court thus allowed a Title VII
claim of intentional sex-based wage discrimination to go forward even
though the female plaintiffs did not perform work equal to that performed
by men. In contrast, the four dissenters adopted what has been referred to
in this Note as the substantive overlap theory, arguing that a Title VII
claim of sex-based wage discrimination should be barred unless the plain-
tiff satisfies the equal work requirement of the EPA.
The majority commenced its search for congressional intent by looking
to the language of the Bennett Amendment, which provides that wage dif-
ferentials do not violate Title VII if they are "authorized" by the EPA.97
The majority stated that the word "authorize" denotes some "affirmative
enabling action," and reasoned that the only differentials authorized by the
EPA are those allowed by its four affirmative defenses.98 However, it rec-
ognized that "authorize" could also mean simply "to permit."99 This latter
definition would support the dissent's view that more than just the four
affirmative defenses were incorporated into Title VII.
Having deciphered the language of the Bennett Amendment and having
concluded that only the EPA's defenses are incorporated into Title VII, the
majority then noted that "[tihe legislative background. . . is fully consis-
tent with this interpretation."'" It first considered Senator Bennett's intro-
ductory statement that the amendment was designed to protect the EPA
95. County of Washington v. Gunther, 101 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (1981).
96. Id at 2254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97. See note 13 supra.
98. 101 S. Ct. at 2247-49.
99. Id at 2247.
100. Id at 2249.
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from being nullified by the passage of Title VII."" The majority felt that
the EPA would not be nullified if its defenses were incorporated into Title
VII.' °2 Although implicitly acknowledging that Senator Bennett's state-
ment could also be read to incorporate the equal work requirement into
Title VII, the majority believed that the statement was "more compatible"
with its interpretation that only the four affirmative defenses were so incor-
porated. 03 This belief was buttressed by Senator Bennett's reference to
his amendment as "technical,"" which the majority inferred to mean
insignificant.' 0 5
The majority next examined Senator Dirksen's comment that the Ben-
nett Amendment merely recognizes certain exceptions carried out by the
Fair Labor Standards Act (to which the EPA is an amendment)."° It de-
cided that Senator Dirksen used the word "exceptions" in reference to the
exemption of certain businesses from the Fair Labor Standards Act's cov-
erage.'0 7 The majority felt that Senator Dirksen's comment showed that
he intended the EPA standards to govern even those sex-based wage dis-
crimination claims that could only be brought under Title VII.' °8 The ma-
jority did not contend that this reading of Senator Dirksen's comment
compelled the interpretation that it had already reached. Rather, the ma-
jority stated that such a reading was "not inconsistent" with its
interpretation. 1°9
All other legislative history was dismissed by the majority as either
"ha[ving] no bearing on the meaning of the. . . Bennett Amendment," " 0
"not provid[ing] a solution to the present problem,""' or being of "no
weight."" 2 The Court mentioned the EEOC's varying interpretations, but
101. Id at 2250.
102. Id
103. Id
104. See note 54 supra for the full text of Senator Bennett's comment.
105. 101 S. Ct. at 2250.
106. See note 57 supra for the full text of Senator Dirksen's comment.
107. 101 S. Ct. at 2251.
108. Id
109. Id Under the majority's reading, Senator Dirksen's comment does little to solve
the problem of whether the EPA's equal work requirement is incorporated into Title VII. It
shows that some of the EPA's standards are incorporated into Title VII, but does not specify
which of these standards are so incorporated. Since Senator Dirksen placed no limitation
upon which standards are incorporated, his statement more strongly supports the dissent's
view that all of the substantive standards are incorporated.
110. Id at 2249 n. 12 (dismissing Senator Clark's memorandum because it predated the
introduction of the Bennett Amendment).
11. Id at 2251 (dismissing Rep. Celler's statements as imprecise).
112. Id at 2251 n.16 (dismissing all post-Title VII passage legislative history).
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relied on none of them. 1 3 Finally, the majority noted that the remedial
nature of both Title VII and the EPA supported its interpretation of the
Bennett Amendment." 4 The majority stated that courts should not inter-
pret Title VII in a manner that deprives discrimination victims of a rem-
edy, unless clearly directed by Congress to do so." 5
The dissent, on the other hand, prefaced its opinion with specific reli-
ance on two canons of statutory construction. First, it said that "[ilt has
long been the rule that when a legislature enacts a statute to protect a class
of persons, the burden is on the plaintiff to show statutory coverage
... ,""I6 Secondly, the dissent relied on a canon of statutory construction
known as in pari materia, "7 which holds that "[w]here there is no clear
intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by
a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment." I" Simply stated,
implied repeals of legislation are disfavored. The dissent interpreted the in
pari materia doctrine to mean that the respondents could maintain their
claim only by showing that Congress intended to repeal the equal work
standard of the EPA when it enacted Title VIIi 19
The dissent then examined the language and legislative history of the
Bennett Amendment, and concluded that it was meant "to insure that the
equal work standard would be the standard by which all wage compensa-
tion claims would be judged."' 2 ° Because the respondents did not satisfy
this standard, the dissent would have dismissed the claims of intentional
sex discrimination.
B. The Inadequacy of the Court's Reasoning
The majority based its holding on the rationale that "authorize" means
an affirmative enabling action rather than mere permission. 12' However,
when one delves beneath the surface of the opinion, it becomes apparent
that the majority did not reach its decision simply by referring to a diction-
ary. Instead, the thesis advanced here is that the majority's holding was
grounded in its policy determination that the remedial nature of Title VII
113. Id at 2251-52.
114. Id at 2252.
115. Id
116. Id at 2254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117. Id at 2255, 2257-58 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) (quoting Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974)).
119. 101 S. Ct. at 2258 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
120. Id at 2264 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).




The majority's outward reliance on the dictionary as determinative of
the issue in Gunther is evidenced by the structure of its opinion. Even
prior to examining the legislative history, the majority had "conclude[d]
that only differentials attributable to the four affirmative defenses of the
Equal Pay Act are 'authorized' by that Act within the meaning of [the
Bennett Amendment]."'' 23 Thus, even though a great deal of the majority
opinion focuses on the legislative history, it apparently was not relied upon
as a basis for the decision.
Therefore, a superficial reading would lead one to believe that the deci-
sive factor was the majority's definition of "authorize." However, since
that word has two plausible definitions, and each points to a different con-
clusion, the majority's heavy reliance on lexical distinctions provides an
insecure foundation for its decision. To complicate matters, the legislative
history is of little help in ascertaining the congressional intent behind the
Bennett Amendment. Both the majority and dissent admitted that the
Bennett Amendment is ambiguous, 24 and indeed it is likely that the 88th
Congress did not even contemplate the type of situation presented in
Gunther.
When the problem is viewed in this light, it seems possible that the de-
terminative factor was actually the Court's policy decision as to which
party should receive a presumption that its interpretation of the congres-
sional intent behind the Bennett Amendment was correct. In a case where
the congressional intent is ambiguous, the party with such a presumption
in its favor will most often prevail. Unfortunately, such analysis must be
somewhat speculative since there is little explicit mention of presumptions
in either of the opinions. Instead, the majority did not fully confront the
issue, and the dissent spoke in terms of canons of statutory construction.
However, because such canons generally establish certain presumptions
about legislative intent,125 one may argue that the adoption of a particular
canon is tantamount to placing the burden of overcoming this presumption
on one party or the other.
While the majority did not explicitly rely on a particular canon, it did
122. A noted authority on statutory interpretation states that "attitudes of judges toward
legislation being construed, whether they be liberally or strictly disposed toward it, can have
an important influence on how it is construed." 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.01, at 461 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973). As will be demonstrated, the
Supreme Court's decision in Gunther testifies to the wisdom of this observation.
123. 101 S. Ct. at 2249.
124. Id at 2247 (majority), 2259 (dissent).
125. See generally R. DICKERSON, supra note 67, at 228.
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note in passing that it would "avoid interpretations of Title VII that de-
prive victims of discrimination of a remedy, without clear congressional
mandate."' 6 In other words, any ambiguity in the statute would be re-
solved in favor of the plaintiffs. Although the dissent criticized the major-
ity for "turn[ing] traditional canons of statutory construction on their
head,"'2 7 the majority's statement is actually quite consistent with tradi-
tional rules of construction. It is well accepted that the courts should liber-
ally construe civil rights statutes in order to effectuate their remedial
aims.' s This rule is further buttressed in this case by Congress' specific
conclusion that a "broad approach" in defining equal employment oppor-
tunity is necessary to combat discrimination.'
2 9
The majority cannot be faulted, therefore, for liberally construing Title
VII and, in effect, placing the burden on the defendant to show that Con-
gress meant to preclude certain victims of sex discrimination from ob-
taining a remedy. However, the majority may be criticized for failing to
properly acknowledge this as its rationale. As previously noted, the major-
ity ostensibly based its opinion on a literal definition of the word "author-
ize," which even it admitted was susceptible of two meanings. Rather than
making a "fortress out of the dictionary,"'13 ° the more sound approach
would have been for the majority to base the opinion upon its intention to
resolve any ambiguity against the defendant.
Although the purported basis for the majority's opinion is somewhat
flawed, the dissent's counterargument that plaintiffs should have the bur-
den of showing statutory coverage may be criticized as violative of the
congressional intent behind Title VII. If applied, this rule would conflict
with the canon that, due to the remedial nature of Title VII, female em-
ployees should be covered unless the defendant can show that Congress
intended otherwise. Conflicts between rules of statutory construction are
"the subjects of honest debate and the stuff of which decisions are
made."'' In this case, Congress included sex discrimination among Title
VII's proscriptions and intended for that statute to be construed liberally.
126. 101 S. Ct. at 2252.
127. Id at 2254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
128. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) ("remedial legislation... is to be
construed generously to further its primary purpose.") See also 3A J. SUTHERLAND, STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72.05, at 392 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973).
129. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1964).
130. 101 S. Ct. at 2262 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Cabll v. Markem, 148
F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), af'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)).
131. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.13, at 45 (4th
ed. C. Sands 1973).
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Thus, the usual practice of placing the burden on the plaintiff to show
statutory coverage should give way to a rebuttable presumption that fe-
male employees are covered.
Furthermore, the dissent's application of the doctrine of in pari materia
to the situation in Gunther was erroneous. The dissent interpreted this doc-
trine in a manner which placed the burden on the Gunther respondents to
show that, in enacting Title VII, Congress intended to repeal the equal
work standard of the EPA. However, allowing a Title VII claim of inten-
tional sex-based wage discrimination without a showing of equal work
does not impliedly repeal or nullify the EPA, any more than allowing a
Title VII claim of sex discrimination in hiring does. Both are examples of
situations not contemplated by the EPA. Thus, they may extend beyond
the EPA, but they do not repeal or nullify it.'32 Hence, the Gunther deci-
sion does not violate the doctrine of in pari materia.
IV. THE IMPACT OF GUNTHER AND THE LINGERING ISSUE OF
COMPARABLE WORTH
The ramifications of the Gunther decision are difficult to gauge. Al-
though the dissent labelled it "virtually meaningless,"' 33 the decision does
have more significance than the dissent acknowledged. No longer is there
any question whether the Bennett Amendment allows an employer to
"willfully discriminate against women in a way in which it could not dis-
criminate against blacks or whites, Jews or Gentiles, Protestants or
132. That allowing Title VII sex-based wage discrimination suits in the absence of a
showing of equal work does not impliedly repeal or nullify the EPA is made clear by exam-
ining a case in which the doctrine of in pari materia was correctly applied. In Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), two federal statutes were at issue. The first statute was the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, § 12, 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1976), which grants Indians an
employment preference for jobs at the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The other statute
was the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 11, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976),
which prohibits race discrimination in most federal employment.
Non-Indian employees of the BIA brought suit, claiming that the 1934 act giving job
preference to Indians at the BIA had been repealed by the 1972 act prohibiting employment
discrimination by the federal government. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 539. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, saying that implied repeals of legislation are disfa-
vored. Id at 549-51.
A comparison of Morton with Gunther demonstrates that the dissent's application of in
pari materia in Gunther was inaccurate. In Morton, Indians had been granted a positive
right to preferred treatment in the employment process. Had the Supreme Court interpreted
the later act to prohibit such a preference, the earlier act would have been nullified. In
contrast, the EPA does not grant employers a positive right to discriminate against employ-
ees who do not satisfy the equal work requirement. Thus, the EPA is not repealed or nulli-
fied by allowing a Title VII suit for intentional sex-based wage discrimination.
133. 101 S. Ct. at 2255 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Catholics, Italians or Irish, or any other group protected by [Title VII]." 134
The Supreme Court has answered this question in the negative and, in so
doing, elevated women to the position which they deserve under Title VII.
Victims of intentional sex-based wage discrimination are now guaranteed
a remedy regardless of whether they satisfy the EPA's stringent equal work
requirement.
However, the dissent is correct in inferring that the most significant as-
pect of Gunther is the issue that the Court did not decide: The majority
reserved ruling on exactly what proof was sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII absent a show-
ing of equal work.' 35 It specifically noted that it did not decide the propri-
ety of a Title VII claim based on comparable worth. 136 The only guidance
given by the majority in the area of sex-based wage discrimination under
Title VII was that plaintiffs could "seek to prove, by direct evidence, that
their wages were depressed because of intentional sex discrimination
,,137
Since the Court has never ruled on a comparable worth claim, the legal
basis for such a claim shall briefly be examined. Most likely, a Title VII
comparable worth claim would be brought under the disparate impact the-
ory.138 The allegation would be that, due to traditional patterns of dis-
crimination, an employer's facially neutral practice of setting wages (e.g.,
paying the market rate) adversely affected a class protected by Title VII.
Plaintiffs would have to establish this disparate impact by showing that
they were paid less than others for work of a comparable value to the
employer.
The four dissenters in Gunther explicitly rejected sex-based comparable
worth. Moreover, the majority kept its opinion narrow enough to allow
the possibility that some of its members may one day disapprove of the
concept of sex-based comparable worth. The question which then arises is
whether the Court could reject sex-based comparable worth while still re-
maining faithful to the majority's reasoning in Gunther.
Theoretically, the Supreme Court could reject sex-based comparable
worth in one of two ways and still adhere to the Gunther reasoning. The
first possibility would be the rejection of comparable worth in tote. In
134. UE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1097 (3d Cir. 1980), cerl. denied,
101 S. Ct. 3122 (1981).
135. 101 S. Ct. at 2246 n.8.
136. Id at 2246.
137. Id




other words, the Court could refuse to allow any of Title VII's protected
,classes to assert a comparable worth claim. This seems unlikely since com-
parable worth is consistent with established Title VII principles.1
9
The second and more likely possibility would be for the Supreme Court
to reject sex-based comparable worth by relying on the fourth affirmative
defense of the EPA, which allows wage differentials if they are based on
any "factor other than sex.""' Under Gunther, this defense is incorpo-
rated into Title VII sex-based wage discrimination cases. 14 1 It gives an
employer great leeway in justifying facially neutral wage practices that
have an adverse impact on women. For example, if an employer based his
salary structure on the market rate, plaintiffs working in predominately
female occupied jobs, who could show that this caused them to be paid less
than their actual value to the employer, would establish a prima facie vio-
lation of Title VII. However, if the court finds the market rate to be a
"factor other than sex,"' 42 then the difference between the plaintiffs' value
to the employer and their salaries would be permissible under Gunther.
V. CONCLUSION
By allowing a Title VII action for intentional sex-based wage discrimi-
nation without a showing of equal work, the Supreme Court in Gunther
put an end to some of the confusion which had been steadily mounting
among the federal circuits. Nevertheless, the scope of Title VII's protec-
tion against sex discrimination in employment remains unclear. In refusing
to specify the type of proof required for a sex-based wage discrimination
claim to be upheld under Title VII, the Supreme Court has left it to the
lower courts to develop a body of case law in this area one step at a time.
Furthermore, although the Court interpreted the Bennett Amendment as
incorporating the EPA's four affirmative defenses into Title VII, a decision
on the thorny issue of comparable worth was deferred to another day.
Despite all of these unanswered questions, the Gunther decision remains
significant. It ensures that victims of intentional sex discrimination will
not be remediless. More importantly, it sends a strong signal to the busi-
139. Comparable worth, where based on the theory that an employer's facially neutral
practice has adversely affected a class protected under Title VII, seems fully consistent with
the disparate impact theory.
140. See note I supra.
141. 101 S. Ct. at 2248-49.
142. Note that it could be argued that sexual discrimination is built into the market to
such an extent that the market rate cannot be considered a "factor other than sex." Cf.
Washington Post, Sept. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 1 (government study finds that discrimination
against women is "deeply embedded in the institutions and traditions of the labor market"
and is the major reason why women are paid approximately 40% less than men).
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ness community that intentional discrimination on the basis of sex will no
longer be tolerated.
Sean Connelly
